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BUSINESS LAW
I.

EFFECT OF FRAUDULENT INSURANCE CLAIM LIMITED

In Johnson v. South State Insurance Co.' the South Carolina Supreme Court held that the insured's fraudulent claim for
loss of unscheduled personal property (household contents) defeated recovery for only the unscheduled personal property. The
court ruled that the provisions of the policy were severable and,
therefore, the fraud did not preclude recovery for loss of dwelling and additional living expenses.2 The Johnson holding places
South Carolina among a minority of jurisdictions that allow an
insured who has submitted a knowingly false claim to recover for
any part of the loss insured under a single policy.3
1. 288 S.C. 239, 341 S.E.2d 793 (1986).
2. Id.
3. "The general rule seems to be that fraud, attempted fraud, or false swearing as
to any part of the property included in a proof of loss prevents recovery for any portion
thereof." 5A J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 3595 (1970). See generally 44

Am.

JUR. 2D

Insurance § 1341 (1975); R.

KEETON, INSURANCE LAW

§§ 6.5(c) & 7.2(b)

(1971); 45 C.J.S. Insurance § 1021 (1946). For jurisdictions following the majority position, see Smith v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 213 F. Supp. 675 (D. Tenn. 1963), aff'd in
part,rev'd in part on other groundssub nom. Trice v. Commercial Union Assur. Co., 334
F.2d 673 (6th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 915 (1965); Oshkosh Packing & Provision
Co. v. Mercantile Ins. Co., 31 F. 200 (E.D. Wis. 1887); Home Ins. Co. v. Hardin, 528
S.W.2d 723 (Ky. 1975); Hall v. Western Underwriters' Ass'n, 106 Mo. App. 476, 81 S.W.
227 (1904); Moreau v. Palatine Ins. Co., 84 N.H. 422, 151 A. 817 (1930); Sunbright Fashions, Inc. v. Greater N.Y. Mut. Ins. Co., 34 A.D.2d 235, 310 N.Y.S.2d 760 (1970); Saks &
Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 23 N.Y.2d 161, 242 N.E.2d 833, 295 N.Y.S.2d 668 (1968);
Happy Hank Auction Co. v. American Eagle Fire Ins. Co., 286 A.D. 505, 145 N.Y.S.2d
206 (1955), modified, 1 N.Y.2d 534, 136 N.E.2d 842, 154 N.Y.S.2d 870 (1956); Henricksen
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Johnson sued South State to recover benefits under a homeowner's policy which provided fire coverage of $15,000 on the
dwelling, $7,500 on unscheduled personal property, and $3,000
for additional living expenses. South State denied liability on
the ground that Johnson filed a fraudulent claim for the unscheduled personal property. The jury, however, awarded Johnson $15,500 for the loss of dwelling and additional living expenses pursuant to instructions from the trial judge that the
policy was severable and that the fraud need not defeat the entire recovery.4
The court of appeals reversed the trial court's judgment and
ruled that under the terms of the insurance contract, Johnson's
act of submitting a fraudulent claim for the household contents
invalidated the entire policy and precluded all recovery under
the policy. 5 The South Carolina Supreme Court disagreed with
the court of appeals and followed the earlier federal district
court interpretation of South Carolina insurance law in Kerr v.
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.e Both Kerr and Johnson establish the rule that when an insurance policy covers separately valued items, the policy is divisible, and a fraudulent claim operates to void only the provision directly tainted by the fraud. 7
The opposing conclusions reached by the court of appeals
and by the supreme court follow divergent lines of reasoning
which include contrary readings of South Carolina precedent
and different views regarding the most salient public policy implications. The court of appeals' decision was grounded on an
examination of the insurance contract between Johnson and

South State. The South State policy contained a fraud clause
common to most fire insurance policies. The fraud clause expressly provided that the "entire policy" would be void if, after
a loss, the insured was guilty of fraud or false swearing concern-

v. Home Ins. Co., 237 Or. 539, 392 P.2d 324 (1964); Home Ins. Co. v. Connelly, 104 Tenn.

93, 56 S.W. 828 (1900); Moore v. Virginia Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 69 Va. (28 Gratt.) 508
(1877); Mosie v. Automobile Ins. Co., 105 W. Va. 226, 141 S.E. 871 (1928); Worachek v.
New Denmark Mut. Home Fire Ins. Co., 102 Wis. 88, 78 N.W. 411 (1899).
4. Johnson v. South State Ins. Co., 286 S.C. 235, 236, 332 S.E.2d 778, 778 (Ct.
App. 1985).
5. Id. at 237, 332 S.E.2d at 779.
6. 552 F. Supp. 992 (D.S.C. 1982), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds,
731 F.2d 227 (4th Cir. 1984).
7. Id. at 993; 288 S.C. at 241, 341 S.E.2d at 794.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol39/iss1/3

2

1987]

Courie:
Business
BusiNsS
LAWLaw

ing the subject of the insurance.8 Since under South Carolina
law any contract-including an insurance contract-is to be
"understood in its plain, ordinary and popular sense,"' the court
reasoned that the contract should be construed and enforced according to its terms.' 0 The court of appeals further justified its
decision to preclude all recovery due to a fraudulent claim of
loss by the insured as consonant with the established policy of
promoting honesty, good faith, and fair dealing between the parties to an insurance contract."
The supreme court's decision was based on the court's analysis of a line of South Carolina cases involving breach of condi-

tions to insurance policy coverage. The court cited Trakas v.
Globe & Rutgers Fire Insurance Co.12 for the well-established
'13
rule that "forfeitures of insurance contracts are not favored.
Trakas also supports the proposition that when a policy could

8. The policy issued to Johnson contained the following language:
This entire policy shall be void if, whether before or after a loss, the insured
has willfully concealed or misrepresented any material fact or circumstance
concerning this insurance or the subject thereof, or the interest of the insured
therein, or in case of any fraud or false swearing by the insured relating
thereto.
286 S.C. at 236, 322 S.E.2d at 778-79. An innocent overestimation or mistake will not
establish fraud. To balance the harshness of the rule, courts have placed a heavy burden
on the insurer to establish that the false statements are of material facts and were willfully and knowingly made with the intention of defrauding the insurer. Nabors v. South
Carolina Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 273 S.C. 126, 129, 255 S.E.2d 337, 338 (1979);
Mulkey v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 243 S.C. 121, 126, 132 S.E.2d 278, 281
(1963). See generally Annotation, Overvaluation in Proofof Loss of PropertyInsured as
Fraud Avoiding Fire Insurance Policy, 16 A.L.R.3D 774 (1967).
9. 286 S.C. at 237, 332 S.E.2d at 779 (citing Carroway v. Johnson, 245 S.C. 200,
139 S.E.2d 908 (1965)); see also Gambrell v. Travelers Ins. Co., 280 S.C. 69, 310 S.E.2d
814 (1983); General Ins. Co. of Am. v. Palmetto Bank, 268 S.C. 355, 233 S.E.2d 699
(1977); Helton v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 286 S.C. 220, 332 S.E.2d 776 (Ct. App.
1985); Jenkins v. Southern Home Ins. Co., 284 S.C. 320, 326 S.E.2d 176 (Ct. App. 1985).
10. 286 S.C. at 237, 332 S.E.2d at 779.
11. Id. at 238, 332 S.E.2d at 779; see Chaachou v. American Cent. Ins. Co., 241 F.2d
889 (5th Cir. 1957). Cf. Nichols v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 279 S.C. 336, 306
S.E.2d 616 (1983); Brown v. South Carolina Ins. Co., 284 S.C. 47, 324 S.E.2d 641
(1984)(insurers held to covenant of good faith and fair dealing). A further deterrent is
provided by the statute which makes presentation of a knowingly false claim to an insurance company a misdemeanor punishable by a fine, imprisonment, or both. S.C. CODE
ANN. § 38-9-310 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1986).
12. 141 S.C. 64, 139 S.E. 176 (1927)(insurer's violation of provision limiting additional insurance on fixtures precluded recovery on fixtures, but did not preclude recovery
on merchandise covered by the policy).
13. 288 S.C. at 241, 341 S.E.2d at 794.
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have been issued in two divisible parts, the policy is severable,
and breach of a condition going to one part results in forfeiture
14
of that part only.
On facts similar to those in Johnson, the federal district
court in Kerr interpreted South Carolina insurance law as requiring that a fraudulent claim for the contents of a home operated to cancel only that part of the policy to which the fraud
directly applied.16 The Kerr holding follows the Reynolds-McGee rule which stipulates that to void a provision of an insurance policy, the breach of condition must be causative. 6 For example, the supreme court recently applied the Reynolds-McGee
rule in South Carolina Insurance Co. v. Collins.17 The court
held that since there was no causal connection between an airplane crash and the failure of the insured pilot to have a valid
medical certificate as required by the policy, the estate of the
18
insured would not be denied recovery.
The issue not addressed by the Kerr-Johnson rationale is
whether the causative condition analogy applies when the insured has knowingly and willfully submitted a false claim with
the intent to defraud the insurer. The court of appeals' position,
that the causal connection analysis is not applicable, is supported by prior cases that restate the Trakas rule to exclude
specifically the divisibility of policy provisions in situations of
fraud or false swearing by the insured.1 9 In Evans v. Century

14. Id. "[W]here the property insured consists of different items which are separately valued or insured for separate amounts, the contract is divisible, and a breach of
warranty or condition as to one item will not affect the insurance on the remainder of
the property, even though the premium be entire." 141 S.C. at 69, 139 S.E. at 177.
15. 552 F. Supp. 992 (D.S.C. 1982), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds,
731 F.2d 227 (4th Cir. 1984).
16. See McGee v. Globe Indem. Co., 173 S.C. 380, 175 S.E. 849 (1934)(where there
was no causal connection between the policy exclusion of coverage based on the age of
the driver and the collision, the provision of the policy excluding coverage of an unlawful
driver did not void the insurer's liability); Reynolds v. Life & Casualty Ins. Co., 161 S.C.
214, 164 S.E. 602 (1932) (since the insured's injuries were not proximately caused by
riding on the running board in violation of a city ordinance, the breach of the policy
provision excluding liability for loss sustained while committing an act in violation of the
law was held not to deny recovery).
17. 269 S.C. 282, 237 S.E.2d 358 (1977).
18. Id.
19. See, e.g., Johnson v. South State Ins. Co., 286 S.C. 235, 238, 332 S.E.2d 778, 780
(Ct. App. 1985).
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Insurance Co.20 the Trakas rule was restated to read as follows:
"[T]he rule established by the great weight of decisions is that
in the absence of fraud or any act condemned by public policy,
the contract is divisible ...."21 Stated conversely, when fraud by

the insured is present, the policy is not divisible. This position
seems to be favored in both Nabors v. South CarolinaFarm Bu23
reau22 and Mulkey v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.

Since Evans did not involve fraud, and fraud was not established in Nabors and Mulkey, the Kerr opinion dismissed as
dicta the language recognizing the fraud exception to policy divisibility. 24 In Johnson the supreme court expressly overruled

Evans, Nabors, and Mulkey.25
Comparison of the court of appeals' opinion with the supreme court's opinion raises the additional issue of whether the
contract clause which stipulated that a fraudulent claim would
void the "entire policy" should be enforced. The court of appeals, in accord with the majority of jurisdictions, decided that
the fraud clause should be enforced to preclude all recovery
under the contract.2 Since the supreme court failed to address
the contract issue, it is not clear how the court justified not enforcing the contract according to its terms. Johnson does make
clear, however, that if a policy covers separately valued items,
the policy will be construed as divisible, and standard contract
language prohibiting fraud by the insured will not be enforced to
deny total recovery.
South Carolina insurance law mandates that when a policy
is ambiguous or capable of two reasonable interpretations, the
policy must be construed to permit recovery by the insured.
Perhaps the supreme court used the separate valuation of the

20. 201 S.C. 273, 22 S.E.2d 877 (1942).
21. Id. at 280, 22 S.E.2d at 880 (emphasis added).
22. 273 S.C. 126, 255 S.E.2d 337 (1979).
23. 243 S.C. 121, 132 S.E.2d 278 (1963).
24. 552 F. Supp. at 994 (D.S.C. 1982), aff'd in part,rev'd in part on other grounds,
731 F.2d 227 (4th Cir. 1984).
25. 288 S.C. at 241, 341 S.E.2d at 794.
26. See sources and cases cited supra note 3.
27. See Gaskins v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield, 271 S.C. 101, 245 S.E.2d 598 (1978);
Emmanuel Baptist Church v. Southern Mut. Church Ins. Co., 259 S.C. 223, 191 S.E.2d
255 (1972); Hann v. Carolina Casualty Ins. Co., 252 S.C. 518, 167 S.E.2d 420 (1969). But
see Deese v. American Bankers Life Assur. Co., 264 S.C. 160, 208 S.E.2d 736 (1974);
Long v. Adams, 280 S.C. 401, 312 S.E.2d 262 (Ct. App. 1984).
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personal property, the dwelling, and the additional living expenses as reasons to construe the policy as severable. By construing the policy as severable, the court prevented voiding the
"entire policy," which seems to be required by the language of
the fraud clause in the contract. Practitioners should note, however, that the Johnson decision did not address a potential recovery for items within the personal property valuation which
were actually destroyed. The decision probably should be read
as permitting recovery only for items both separately valued and
not within the valuation category directly connected to the
fraudulent claim.
Perhaps the most compelling justification for the Johnson
ruling is the well-established public policy theme in South Carolina insurance law that forfeitures are to be avoided.2" Though
this policy was not articulated by the court, forfeiture of the entire recovery for the loss of both personal property and of dwelling would place an extreme hardship on an insured. The result
of Johnson is that the insured, though guilty of submitting a
fraudulent claim, will forfeit only that separately valued portion
of the recovery directly tainted by the fraud. The insured will be
protected from the harsher result of forfeiture of the entire coverage under the policy.
Janis Y. Dickman
II. IMPACT ON PUBLIC NECESSARY TO INVOKE UNFAIR TRADE
PRACTICES ACT

In Noack Enterprises, Inc. v. Country Corner Interiors of
Hilton Head Island, Inc.29 the court of appeals held that fraudulent or unfair conduct must have an impact on the public interest to be actionable under the South Carolina Unfair Trade
Practices Act (UTPA) ° The court sustained a demurrer to
Noack's UTPA cause of action alleging unfair practices in connection with the sale of a retail business to Noack.3 1 Noack did
not allege that the practices would have an impact on the pub-

28.
29.
Adv. Sh.
30.
31.

See cases cited supra notes 12, 13 and 27.
290 S.C. 475, 351 S.E.2d 347 (Ct. App. 1986), cert. granted, No. 0828, Davis
No. 18 (S.C. May 30, 1987).
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 39-5-10 to -430 (Law. Co-op. 1985).
290 S.C. at 476, 478, 351 S.E.2d at 348, 350.
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lic. 3 2 The court held that the UTPA was not enacted to redress

purely private wrongs in business transactions not involving the
public interest.3
The suit involved an agreement in which Country Corner
agreed to sell all of its assets to Noack Enterprises. Noack later
sued for breach of contract accompanied by fraudulent acts and
with fraudulent intent, and for violation of the UTPA 4 Country
Corner demurred to the second count, claiming that it failed to
state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action under the
UTPA 5 The trial court sustained
the demurrer and the court of
36
appeals affirmed the trial court.
The Noack court examined the wording of the statute to
give effect to its underlying legislative intent. The statute deems
as unlawful "unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce."37 The statute defines "trade or commerce" to "include
the advertising, offering for sale, sale or distribution of any services and any property, tangible or intangible, real, personal, or
mixed, or any other article, commodity or thing of value wherever situate, and shall include any trade or commerce directly
or indirectly affecting the people of this State."8 The court
held that the "shall include" language limited the use of the
UTPA cause of action to certain kinds of trade or commerce.39
An act or practice which affects only the parties to a particular
commercial transaction, therefore, does not of itself violate the
UTPA.4 °
The UTPA has created a problem that was typified in
Noack: the statute's broad provisions defining the cause of action and providing for treble damages for willful violations have
tempted overanxious plaintiffs to raise dubious complaints of
unfair trade practices.41 The legislature intended the UTPA to
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 478, 479, 351 S.E.2d at 350, 351.
Id.
Id. at 476, 351 S.E.2d at 348.
Id.

36. Id.
37. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-20(a) (Law. Co-op. 1985).

38. S.C.

CODE ANN.

§ 39-5-10(b) (Law. Co-op. 1985) (emphasis added).

39. 290 S.C. at 477, 478, 351 S.E.2d at 349, 350.

40. Id.
41. The Honorable Alexander M. Sanders, Remarks to Students at the Court of
Appeals' Term Held at the University of South Carolina School of Law (Spring 1987).
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control and eliminate "the large scale use of unfair and deceptive trade practices within the state of South Carolina.

'42

The

statute is not a catch-all remedy for fraud, but is instead a consumer protection statute.43 A provision of the statute makes
clear that the legislature intended for the courts to be guided by
existing interpretation of the Federal Trade Commission Act,
which proscribes "[u]nfair methods of competition in commerce
and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce."' "4 The
scope of these "deceptive acts" is defined by the Procedures and
Rules for the Federal Trade Commission: "The Commission acts
only in the public interest and does not initiate investigation or
take other action when the alleged violation of law is merely a
matter of private controversy and does not tend adversely to af'
fect the public."45
The Noack court suggested that one way for an injured
plaintiff to show that the alleged wrong has or will have an adverse impact on the public interest is to show that the act or
practice has the potential for repetition.46 The purpose of the
"potential for repetition" standard is to narrow the applicability
of the UTPA cause of action to those commercial transactions
that will involve, by their very nature, the public and, therefore,
47
the public interest.
The decision of the court of appeals in Noack is of considerable importance in narrowing the applicability of the South Carolina UTPA. Although the Noack court noted that other state
unfair trade practice statutes are not identical to South Carolina's UTPA, 48 the decision comports with the decisions of other
states with similar statutes.4" Practitioners should follow devel42. Note, Consumer Protection and the Proposed "South Carolina Unfair Trade
PracticesAct," 22 S.C.L. REv. 767, 787 (1970); see also Day, The South Carolina Unfair
Trade PracticesAct: Sleeping Giant or Illusive Panacea?, 33 S.C.L. REv. 479 (1982).
43. See Note, supra note 42; Day, supra note 42.
44. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1982).
45. 16 C.F.R. § 2.3 (1987); accord Genesco Entertainment v. Koch, 593 F. Supp.
743, 752 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); see also Federal Trade Comm'n v. Klesner, 280 U.S. 19, 25
(1929). Cf. Gross-Haentjens v. Leckenby, 38 Or. App. 313, 589 P.2d 1209 (1979) (consumer fraud statute providing private right of action for deceptive practices does not
provide a new remedy for common-law torts).
46. 290 S.C. 479, 351 S.E.2d at 351 (citing Anhold v. Daniels, 94 Wash. 2d 40, 614
P.2d 184 (1980)).
47. Id.
48. 290 S.C. at 477, 351 S.E.2d at 349.
49. Evanston Motor Co. v. Southern Toyota Distribs., Inc., 436 F. Supp. 1370 (N.D.
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opments in litigation to determine how the South Carolina
courts will treat complaints which contain various allegations of
potential repetition.
Charles R. Beans
III.

UNIFORM SECURITIES

ACT

GOVERNS SALE

OF

TOTAL STOCK

IN CLOSE CORPORATION

In Carver v. Blanford ° the South Carolina Supreme Court

held that the sale of 100% of the stock of a close corporation fell
within the purview of the South Carolina Uniform Securities
Act.5 1 This holding, based largely upon two 1985 United States
Supreme Court cases construing federal securities laws, 52 recognizes that South Carolina will give broad reading to the term
"security." Confusing statements in Carver, however, leave unclear the extent to which the "sale of business" doctrine, abandoned by the United States Supreme Court, 3 is still viable in
South Carolina.
The dispute in Carver arose out of the Blanfords' sale of all
of the capital stock of a South Carolina corporation. 4 Carver,
the purchaser, later brought suit alleging common-law fraud and
violation of the South Carolina Uniform Securities Act. Carver
based his claims upon alleged misrepresentations and omissions

of material facts in connection with the transaction. 5 At trial
Ill. 1977); Zeeman v. Black, 156 Ga. App. 82, 273 S.E.2d 910 (1980); Butterfield v. Butler,
50 Okla. 381, 150 P. 1078 (1915).
50. 288 S.C. 309, 342 S.E.2d 406 (1986).
51. Id. at 311, 342 S.E.2d at 407. The South Carolina Uniform Securities Act is
codified in S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 35-1-10 to -1590 (Law. Co-op. 1987). By reviewing the
transaction under the Act, the finder of fact may determine whether the seller is liable
under § 35-1-1490 for selling a "security" by means of an omission or a misstatement of a
material fact.
52. The two cases are Landreth Timber v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681 (1985), and
Gould v. Ruefenacht, 471 U.S. 701 (1985).
53. 471 U.S. 681; 471 U.S. 701.
54. Record at 1.
55. Id. In his first cause of action, brought under S.C. CODE ANN. § 35-1-1490 (Law.
Co-op. 1987), Carver sought rescission of the purchase agreement, refund of $20,000 already paid plus interest, and attorneys' fees. In the second cause of action, alleging common-law fraud, Carver prayed for $95,000 in actual damages and $95,000 in punitive
damages. While the complaint appears to have alleged fraud under S.C. CODE ANN. § 351-1210 (Law. Co-op. 1987), the court noted that the appellant admitted that no private
right of action is created by that section. 288 S.C. at 311 n.2, 342 S.E.2d at 407 n.2; see
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the judge found that the transaction did not fall within the
scope of the Act and sustained the Blanfords' demurrer to both
of Carver's causes of action.6
The supreme court noted that the demurrer to the securities claim was granted at trial because the sale of the corporation in question, although termed a stock-purchase agreement,
was not a transaction governed by the South Carolina Uniform
Securities Act.6 7 The trial court had accepted the Blanfords'
contention that the test formulated by the United States Supreme Court in Securities Exchange Commission v. W.J. Howey
Co.58 and United Housing Foundationv. Forman" excluded the
sale of 100% of a corporation from within the ambit of securities
regulation. 0 After trial and prior to argument before the South
Carolina Supreme Court, however, the United States Supreme
1 and Gould v.
Court decided Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth"
s2
Ruefenacht. In Landreth and Gould the Supreme Court rejected the "sale of business" doctrine and held that when "the
instrument involved is traditional stock, plainly within the statutory definition

. .

. [t]here is no need

. . .

to look beyond the

characteristics of the instrument to determine whether the [federal securities] Acts apply.""3 The Carver court adopted the rea-

Brief of Appellant at 3, 11-12. Whether a private cause of action exists under § 35-11210, which is analogous to 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1987) (popularly known as Rule 10b-5
of the Federal Securities Exchange Act), remains unanswered and may give rise to litigation. The court summarily dismissed the second cause of action because the plaintiff
failed to allege all of the essential elements of fraud. 288 S.C. at 311, 342 S.E.2d at 407.
56. Record at 24.
57. 288 S.C. at 310, 342 S.E.2d at 407.
58. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
59. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
60. The Howey/Forman test posits that the existence of a "security" under the Act
requires "the presence of an investment in a common venture premised on a reasonable
expectation of profits to be derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of
others." 348 U.S. at 852. The sellers in Carver contended that the transaction was not
within the protections of the Act because the sale to the plaintiff involved the entire
business. According to the "sale of business" doctrine, purchase of all of the stock shows
that the buyer does not expect "profits . . .from . . . efforts of others." Id.
61. 471 U.S. 681.
62. 471 U.S. 701. Landreth and Gould are important because South Carolina
courts look to federal securities cases for guidance in interpreting state securities law.
Bradley v. Hullander, 272 S.C. 6, 21, 249 S.E.2d 486, 494 (1978); McGaha v. Mosely, 283
S.C. 268. 273, 322 S.E.2d 461, 464 (Ct. App. 1984).
63. 471 U.S. at 690.
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soning of the Landreth/Gould rule, 4 but also stated that the
"sale of business" doctrine does apply "where control is clearly
passed from seller to buyer." 5 The court, therefore, remanded
the Securities Act claim for a determination of whether control
passed from Blanford to Carver. 6
Carver both clarifies and confuses South Carolina securities
law. By adopting the Landreth/Gould rule the court aligned
South Carolina with the Supreme Court's rejection of the "sale
of business" doctrine when a transaction involves instruments
labelled as stock and having the usual characteristics of stock. 7
The Carver court, however, created new questions about South
Carolina law in this area by adding that the "sale of business"
doctrine still applies to transactions in which control clearly
passes from the seller to the purchaser.6 ' The viability of the
"sale of business" doctrine thus remains in question in South
Carolina.6
D. Kay Tennyson
IV.

JOINT CHECK RULE RECOGNIZED

The South Carolina Court of Appeals held in Glidden Coatings & Resins v. Suitt Construction Co. 7 0 that a materialman

who requests that an owner or general contractor issue joint
checks to him and a subcontractor, with no agreement as to the
allocation of the proceeds, will be deemed to have been paid the
64. 288 S.C. at 310, 342 S.E.2d at 407.
65. Id. at 311, 342 S.E.2d at 407 (emphasis in original).
66. By remanding Carver for further fact-finding, the court implicitly recognized
that the "sale of business" doctrine may still apply in certain cases.
67. In Landreth the United States Supreme Court abandoned the "sale of business" doctrine because it could lead to confusion and "arbitrary distinctions." 471 U.S.
at 705.
68. The Carver case involved the sale of 100% of the stock of a company. If the
court would not find that control had passed when the sale involves 100% of the stock, it
is difficult to ascertain when, if ever, the "sale of business" doctrine would apply. Further, Carvermay spawn additional litigation regarding the definition of the clear passage
of control language. The Carver opinion offers no guidelines for determining the level of
proof necessary to satisfy the clear passage of control requirement.
69. The only state case addressing the "sale of business" doctrine since the Landreth and Gould decisions clearly rejected it. See Specialized Tours, Inc. v. Hagen, 392
N.W.2d 520, 535 (Minn. 1986) (en banc). Consequently, no other jurisdictions offer guidance for future cases dealing with the "sale of business" doctrine in South Carolina.
70. 290 S.C. 241, 349 S.E.2d 89 (Ct. App. 1986).
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money due him up to the amount of the checks that he endorses.7 1 The decision relied on the principles set forth by the
South Carolina Supreme Court in City Lumber Co. v. National
Surety Corp.72 and recognized that City Lumber established the
"joint check rule. '7 3 The court of appeals' opinion serves as a
stern reminder that a materials supplier who attains co-payee
status with a subcontractor to ensure payment for materials furnished must be diligent in protecting his interests.
This controversy arose from a construction project for which
Suitt was the general contractr, Arrow Painting and Sandblasting was the subcontractor, and Glidden was the paint supplier to
Arrow. Because Arrow had failed to pay Glidden for certain
materials furnished on previous projects, Glidden required Arrow to request that Suitt issue checks payable jointly to Glidden
and Arrow until Arrow's account with Glidden was paid in full.
Suitt refused to guarantee the issuance of joint checks or any
payment to Glidden, but indicated that it would attempt to
make the checks payable jointly. Suitt issued five joint checks,
totalling $26,133.00 to Glidden and Arrow, and Glidden endorsed each of the checks, even though Glidden received none of
the proceeds.74 Arrow eventually abandoned the project, owing
Glidden $19,300.26. At no time prior to Arrow's abandonment
did Glidden notify Suitt that it had not received full payment
for the materials furnished to Arrow. Because the account remained unsatisfied, Glidden brought suit to foreclose its
mechanic's lien and to recover against Suitt's bond. 5
The circuit court, on the authority of City Lumber, held
that Suitt's obligation to pay Glidden was discharged by Glidden's endorsement of the joint checks.7 ' In City Lumber the
supplier of paint and the subcontractor requested that the general contractor make a payment on the general contractor's
agreement with the subcontractor, which would allow the subcontractor to make payments to the supplier on past due labor
and materials accounts. The contractor issued a $3,500 check

71. Id. at 244, 349 S.E.2d at 91.
72. 229 S.C. 115, 92 S.E.2d 128 (1956).

73. 290 S.C. at 244, 349 S.E.2d at 91.
74. Id. at 242, 349 S.E.2d at 90.

75. Id. at 243, 349 S.E.2d at 90.
76. Id.
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payable jointly to the supplier and subcontractor without directing the division of the proceeds. With the supplier's permission, the subcontractor endorsed the check with the supplier's
name; the subcontractor later issued its own check for only $500
to the supplier.
The supreme court ruled in City Lumber that the general
contractor and its surety were released from liability for the subcontractor's indebtedness to the supplier when the subcontractor abandoned the project.7 8 The court reasoned that the supplier, by endorsing the check without collecting the amount due
on its account, forfeited its claim on the performance bond.79
This result followed from the two well-recognized rules of law
that "'when a creditor has in his hands the means of paying his
debt out of the property of his principal debtor, and does not
use it, but gives it up, the surety is discharged,' "0 and that
"where one of two innocent parties must suffer a loss, it must be
borne by that one of them, who, by his conduct, has rendered
the injury possible.""' In the court's opinion, to allow recovery
would have been unfair because the supplier had an opportunity
to satisfy the debt and failed to protect itself by securing payment on its account before endorsing the check.8 2
The court of appeals viewed the City Lumber outcome as
dispositive of Glidden's foreclosure claim.8 Glidden requested
joint checks specifically because Arrow had previously failed to
make timely payments on its debts to Glidden. In the court's
estimation, "[t]he case would be little different if Suitt, at Glidden's request, had paid Glidden directly by check for the paints
and materials and Glidden had then endorsed the check to Arrow." 84 Under these circumstances the court deemed that Glidden had been paid up to the amount of the joint checks.85

77. 229 S.C. at 117, 92 S.E.2d at 129.
78. Id. at 119, 92 S.E.2d at 130.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 120, 92 S.E.2d at 131 (quoting Commercial Nat'l Bank v. Henninger, 105
Pa. 496 (1884)).
81. Id. at 121, 92 S.E.2d at 131.
82. Id. at 119, 92 S.E.2d at 130.
83. 290 S.C. at 243, 349 S.E.2d at 90.
84. Id. at 245, 349 S.E.2d at 91.
85. Two of the five joint checks were issued before any money was due on Arrow's
account with Glidden. The amount of these checks, $8,997.08, was therefore deducted
from the total of $26,133.00. This left Suitt exposed to liability of $2,164.34 on the
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The supreme court's decision in City Lumber required the
result in Glidden. For application of the "joint check rule," the
cases are virtually indistinguishable. While there was no agreement in either case about the disposition of proceeds, "the only
reasonable inference warranted by the circumstances [was] that
[the supplier] was made a co-payee to enable it to collect
whatever amount might be owing to it." 6 The logical assumption of the contractor in either case should have been that the
supplier was collecting on its account, and the contractor, therefore, should not have been responsible later to make payment of
that account. If this had not been intended, there would have
been no reason to issue the checks in both names.
Absent the request for co-payee status, however, the result
in Glidden may not have been the same. If, for some reason,
joint checks were issued without such a request, the general
principles cited in the cases may still support an affirmative
duty of the supplier to satisfy his debts out of the available
funds.

7

The court in Glidden, however, chose not to discuss the

broader implications of its decision that this scenario suggests.
The court's focus on the specific request for joint checks and the
carefully worded holding probably indicates that not only must
the supplier fail to avail itself of the opportunity to satisfy its
debts, but also it must have created that opportunity in the first
place.
The court of appeals in Glidden used the foundations of the
"joint check rule" established in City Lumber to formulate a
specific rule of conduct for suppliers of materials. An owner or
general contractor will not be liable to a supplier for a subcon-

$19,300.26 owing on Arrow's account with Glidden.
86. 229 S.C. at 119, 92 S.E.2d at 130. This inference would arguably not be necessary in Glidden because Glidden requested the joint check for the specific purpose of
enabling it to satisfy its account in full. 290 S.C. at 242, 349 S.E.2d at 90.
87. The court in City Lumber seemed to limit its holding in stating the following:
The surety was equitably entitled to have the check applied to the discharge of
the debts for which it was bound, but this was not done because of the negligence of [the supplier] in empowering [the subcontractor] to use the funds for
any purpose which he desired. This is not a case of non-action on the part of
the creditor, but positive and affirmative action injuriously affecting the surety.
229 S.C. at 120, 92 S.E.2d at 130. One writer has suggested that this language was a
necessary corrollary to the principles relied upon in City Lumber and perhaps implicit in
its holding. Karesh, Security Transactions, Survey of South CarolinaLaw, 9 S.C.L.Q.
134 (1956).
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tractor's debt to the supplier for the amount of joint checks issued at the instance of the supplier for the very purpose of satisfying that debt. Practitioners should be diligent in advising
clients to use the protective measure of joint checks to secure
payment, especially if the checks are issued at the client's
request.
David A. Savage

V. TIME

LIMITATION IN LIFE INSURANCE POLICY UPHELD

In Smith v. Independent Life & Accident Insurance Co.88
the South Carolina Supreme Court addressed the validity of an
insurance policy clause which excluded coverage for a death occurring more than ninety days after the original injury. The time
limitation was challenged as violative of public policy.8 9 The supreme court, emphasizing freedom of contract and the problems
related to proof of causation when death occurs long after an
original injury, upheld the clause as valid and enforceable.9 0
Walter Smith was involved in an automobile accident on
February 14, 1982. During his convalescence, he developed pneumonia and he died on August 6, 1982.91 Ruth Smith, mother of
the insured and beneficiary of Smith's accidental death policy,
92
brought a claim under the policy for the $6,000 in proceeds.
The insurance company denied the claim because a clause in the
policy excluded coverage for death occurring more than ninety
days after the original injury. Ruth Smith then sued the insurer.
At trial the presiding judge upheld the ninety day limitation in
the policy and granted the insurance company's motion for summary judgment.9 3 The sole issue on appeal was whether the
ninety day provision violated public policy.
In upholding the provision, the South Carolina Supreme
Court joined the majority of jurisdictions which have considered
the validity of time limitation provisions in accident insurance

88. 289 S.C. 262, 346 S.E.2d 22 (1986).
89. Brief of Appellant at 7.

90. 289 S.C. at 262, 346 S.E.2d at 23.
91. Record at 23.

92. Record at 2.
93. Record at 23-26.
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policies. 4 The court placed great emphasis on preserving freedom of contract. Other courts also have held that an insurance
policy is a voluntary contract into which the parties freely enter,
and, therefore, the unambiguous contract terms should bind
both parties. 5 The supreme court further emphasized the mdny
problems related to proof of causation when death occurs long
after the original injury.9 6 Several cases indicate that time limitation provisions minimize uncertainty about the cause of the
insured's death, thus "enabling insurers to solve difficult ques97
tions of proximate cause.1
Perhaps the most compelling reason for the court's refusal
to invalidate the time limitation was the court's reluctance to
intervene in matters which are best left to the legislature and
the South Carolina Insurance Department. The Insurance Department must approve all contracts for insurance in South Carolina before the policies can be written and issued. Assuming
that the contract at issue in Smith was approved, the approval
procedure provides strong evidence that the legislature does not
believe the use of such limitation periods violates public policy. 9
Only two jurisdictions have found similar time limitations
to be against public policy, and two other jurisdictions have applied the "process of nature rule" rather than finding the provision to be violative of public policy.9 Courts that have applied
the "process of nature rule" have refused to enforce such clauses

94. See Annotation, Validity and Construction of Provision in Accident Insurance
Policy Limiting Coverage for Death or Loss of Member to Death or Loss Occurring
Within Specific PeriodAfter Accident, 39 A.L.R.3D 1311 (1971); see also Bently v. Independent Life & Accident Ins. Co., 47 Ala, App. 15, 249 So. 2d 631 (1971); Haines v.
Southern Life & Health Ins. Soc'y, 363 So. 2d 175 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Rhodes v.
Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 54 Ohio St. 2d 45, 374 N.E.2d 643 (1978).
95. See Douglas v. Southwestern Life Ins. Co., 374 S.W.2d 788 (Tex. Civ. App.
1964); Brown v. United States Casualty Co., 95 F. 935, 936 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1899).
96. 289 S.C. at 263, 346 S.E.2d at 23.
97. Record at 24; see also Fontenot v. New York Life Ins. Co., 357 So. 2d 1185 (La.
Ct. App. 1978); Rhodes v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 54 Ohio St. 2d 45, 374 N.E.2d
643 (1978).
98. See Kirk v. Financial Sec. Life Ins. Co., 75 Ill.
2d 367, 389 N.E.2d 144 (1978).
99. For cases which find the limitation violative of public policy, see Karl v. New
York Life Ins. Co., 139 N.J. Super. 318, 353 A.2d 564 (1976); Burne v. Franklin Life Ins.
Co., 451 Pa. 218, 301 A.2d 799 (1973). Georgia and California extended the "process of
nature" rule in Strickland v. Gulf Life Ins. Co., 240 Ga. 723, 242 S.E.2d 148 (1978), and
National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Edwards, 119 Cal. App. 3d 326, 174 Cal. Rptr. 31

(1981).
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when enforcement might cause a victim's family and physicians
to make a choice between pursuing a slim chance of an accident
victim's recovery and risking forfeiture of the proceeds of the
policy because of a time limitation clause. 100 In Karl v. New
York Life Insurance Co. 01 the Superior Court of New Jersey
stated that the decision about when to terminate life support
systems is the "most difficult of human decisions" 10 2 and
"should not be influenced by the crass thought that death benefits will be reduced if the patient lives beyond a certain number
0 3
of days.'
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania also recognized this dilemma in Burne v. Franklin Life Insurance Co. 04 and stated
that "[t]o predicate liability under a life insurance policy upon
death occurring only on or prior to a specific date, while denying
policy recovery if death occurs after that fixed date, offends the
basic concepts and fundamental objectives of life insurance and
[is] contrary to public policy."' 1 5 The courts in both Burne and
Karl refused to enforce the ninety day time limitation provision.
Although these decisions appear to conflict with the court's
ruling in Smith, they may be reconcilable. The facts of Burne
and Karl are distinguishable from the facts of Smith in two important ways. First, in both Burne and Karl there was no question of whether the accident caused the insured's death. 00 Al-

100. The recent development of the problem was illustrated in Burne in which the

court said:
The [time limitation] provision has its origins at a much earlier stage of

medicine. Accordingly, the leading case construing the provision predates three
decades of progress in the field of curative medicine. Advancements made during that period have enabled the medical profession to become startlingly adept at delaying death for indeterminate periods. Physicians and surgeons now
stand at the very citadel of death, possessing the awesome responsibility of

sometimes deciding whether and what measure should be used to prolong, even
though momentarily, an individual's life. The legal and ethical issues attending

such deliberations are gravely complex.
451 Pa. 218, 221-22, 301 A.2d 799, 801 (1973).
101. 139 N.J. Super. 318, 353 A.2d 564 (1976).

102. Id. at 325, 353 A.2d at 568.
103. Id.

104. 451 Pa. 218, 301 A.2d 799 (1973).
105. Id. at 222, 301 A.2d at 802.

106. In Burne the court stated that "it is conceded by the.

. .

insurance company

that the injuries sustained were the direct and sole cause of the insured's death." 451 Pa.
at 220-21, 301 A.2d at 801. In Karl the court stated that "it has been clearly and con-

vincingly established that Karl died

. . .
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though the court in Smith did not address whether the accident
was the proximate cause of the insured's death, the situation
was not as clear as the those before the courts in Burne and
Karl.
The second and most important distinction between Smith
and the Burne and Karl cases is that in the latter cases, at some
point between the accident and the death, life support systems
aided the insured and the insured may have been incapable of
surviving without them. 107 In Burne and Karl, therefore, the insured's family and physicians could have been confronted with
the very choice which those courts sought to avoid. Smith did
not indicate that the insured's family and his physician encountered this dilemma.
These factual distinctions are important in comparing the
relative merits of the public policy arguments advanced in
Smith with those advanced in Burne and Karl. In situations
similar to the facts of Smith, there is danger that the death was
not caused by the accident, but there was no such danger in
Burne or Karl. Thus, the argument in favor of enforcing the
clause was stronger in Smith 08 On the other hand, when, as in
Smith, no possibility exists that the insured's family or physicians would be forced to choose between artificial life for the
insured and the proceeds of his accidental death insurance policy, the public policy argument against enforcement of the
° Although the
clause is less persuasive than in Burne and Karl 09

causes, from accidental bodily injury." 139 N.J. Super. at 324, 353 A.2d at 567.
107. In Burne the court stated that "the most sophisticated medical techniques
[were] utilized, merely to keep [the insured] medically alive, albeit in a vegetative state."
451 Pa. at 220, 301 A.2d at 801. In Karl the court stated that five months after the
accident, the insured "had no immediate need of the full range of sophisticated lifesupport equipment and services of a modern hospital." 139 N.J. Super. at 322, 353 A.2d
at 566. The implication of this statement is that at some other point, Karl was in need of
the life-support equipment.
108. The absence of uncertainty about the cause of death also may weaken the freedom of contract argument. The Karl court pointed out that the purpose of time limitation clauses is "to protect the company from having to pay where it is doubtful that the
death was caused by an accident." 139 N.J. Super. at 327, 353 A.2d at 568.
109. Though the supreme court indicated that whether a particular clause in an insurance contract violates public policy is a question "for legislative consideration," 289
S.C. at 264, 346 S.E.2d at 23, the court appears to have the power to declare an insurance
clause invalid on those grounds. In Rhame v. National Grange Mut. Ins. Co., 238 S.C.
539, 121 S.E.2d 94 (1961), the supreme court stated that insurance companies may limit
their liabilities in any way they please, "provided they are not in contravention of some
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overwhelming weight of authority upholds such time limitations
in insurance policies, the above-mentioned distinctions and arguments should be carefully considered by the practitioner who
litigates a time limitation clause.
James R. Courie

statutory provision or public policy." Id. at 544, 121 S.E.2d at 96; see also Marchant v.
South Carolina Ins. Co., 281 S.C. 585, 316 S.E.2d 707 (Ct. App. 1984).
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